Grenada Land Actors Inc. v The Planning and Development Authority
| Jurisdiction | Grenada |
| Judge | Glasgow J. |
| Judgment Date | 03 December 2022 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [2022] ECSC J0329-1 |
| Docket Number | CLAIM NO. GDAHCV2021/0290 |
| Court | High Court (Grenada) |
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF GRENADA
AND THE WEST INDIES ASSOCIATED STATES
HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
(CIVIL)
The Hon. Mr. Justice Raulston L. A. Glasgow High Court Judge
CLAIM NO. GDAHCV2021/0290
In the Matter of an Application for Judicial Review Pursuant to Part 56 of the Civil Procedure Rules 2000 (As Amended)
and
In the Matter of the Physical Planning and Development Control Act No. 23 of 2016
and
In the Matter of the Decision of the Planning and Development Authority to Grant Approvals for Developments At La Sagesse in the Parish of St. David, Levera in the Parish of St. Patrick and Mt. Hartman in the Parish of St. George
and
In the Matter of the Planning and Development Authority Failing to Keep a Publicly Accessible Register in Accordance with the Physical Planning and Development Control Act 2016
Mr. Leslie Thomas, QC with him Ms. Rita Joseph-Olivetti for the Claimant
Ms. Dia Forrester, Attorney General, with her Mrs. Karen Reid-Ballantyne, Solicitor General, for the Defendant
Mr. John Carrington, QC with him Mrs. Sheila Harris and Ms. Donnika Maxwell for Singapore Heng Sheng (Grenada) Development Pte Ltd
Mr. B. St. Michael Hylton, QC with him Mrs. Daniella Williams-Mitchell and Mr. Sundiata Gibbs for Hartman Group Limited
Mr. Darshan Ramdhani, QC with him Mrs. Sabrita Khan-Ramdhani for Range Developments (Grenada) Limited
There are three applications before the court for consideration, all of which challenge the locus standi of the claimant (hereafter “GLA”) to initiate judicial review proceedings, and seek orders that GLA's claim is struck out. These applications were filed first on 13 th May 2021 by the defendant (hereafter “PADA”), second on 30 th September 2021 by the second named interested party, Hartman Group Limited (hereafter “Hartman”), and third on 11 th October 2021 by the third named interested party, Range Developments (Grenada) Limited (hereafter “Range”) (hereafter collectively “the applicants”).
The grounds of the applications are somewhat similar. They concern whether GLA has a sufficient interest to obtain relief, engaging the question of standing in a judicial review claim.
On 26 th March 2021, GLA filed a without notice application seeking leave to pursue judicial review proceedings against PADA for, among other things —
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(1) the decision made by PADA to grant planning permission for the La Sagesse development in St. David;
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(2) the Levera development in St. Patrick and the Mt. Hartman development in St. George;
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(3) the alleged failure to have a publicly accessible register; and
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(4) the alleged failure to make regulations.
This application was supported by evidence on affidavit deposed to by Dr. Jody Daniel and Mr. Andre Joseph-Witzig, together with certificates of exhibits for each affidavit. The relief sought by GLA included declarations, orders of mandamus and orders of certiorari.
Thereafter, on 30 th March 2021, this court considered GLA's application and ordered that leave is granted to GLA to apply for judicial review. In accordance with that order, on 14 th April 2021, GLA filed a fixed date claim form seeking judicial review. The claim was supported by affidavits sworn by Reginald Joseph, Sandra Ferguson and a second affidavit of Andre Joseph-Witzig.
On 20 th April 2021, PADA was served with the above referenced documents, and on 23 rd April 2021 the Attorney General's Chambers filed an acknowledgment of service on its behalf.
PADA then filed the notice of application which challenges whether GLA has sufficient standing to pursue its judicial review claim. GLA then filed a notice of objection on 26 th May 2021, asserting that PADA's challenge is premature and should not be considered at this stage.
Thereafter the two other applications by Hartman and Range were filed. On 15 th October 2021 the first named interested party, Singapore Heng Sheng (Grenada) Development PTE Ltd (hereafter “Singapore”) filed a notice of intention to assist PADA in its 13 th May 2021 application.
Submissions were filed by the parties in the following order —
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(1) 9 th June 2021 by PADA in support of its application;
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(2) 18 th June 2021 by GLA in response to PADA's application;
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(3) 21 st June 2021 by PADA in reply to GLA's submissions filed 18 th June 2021 and notice of objection filed 26 th May 2021;
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(4) 10 th November 2021 by GLA supplementing submissions filed on 18 th June 2021;
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(5) 16 th November 2021 by Hartman in support of its application;
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(6) 16 th November 2021 by Singapore in support of PADA's application;
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(7) 17 th November 2021 by PADA in reply to GLA's submissions filed 10 th November 2021; and
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(8) 18 th November 2021 by Range in support of its application.
In the first application, filed by PADA, PADA argues that GLA has failed to establish that –
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(1) it has an interest, proprietary or otherwise, in the respective land for which planning permission was granted;
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(2) the developments at the locations will adversely affect it or any of its members which members are said to be anonymous; and
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(3) it is an entity that has a legally recognisable sufficient interest to pursue this judicial review claim.
In the second application, filed by Hartman, Hartman contends that GLA has not established that it falls within any of the categories set out in rule 56.2(2), Civil Procedure Rules 2000 (“CPR”). Hartman also claims that GLA does not otherwise have any or any sufficient interest in the subject matter of these proceedings.
In the third application, filed by Range, Range contends that GLA has failed to establish –
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(1) its interest in the applicant's land situate at La Sagesse;
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(2) how the decision of PADA adversely affects GLA and its members who are unidentifiable and anonymous;
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(3) that it has standing to bring this action since GLA has not satisfied the criteria set out in Part 56.2 of the CPR;
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(4) how, if it at all, it has any or any sufficient interest in the subject matter of these proceedings.
Range's application also argues that GLA's judicial review application ought to be dismissed and struck out for unreasonable delay in the making of the application. Range says that, in addition, GLA's application if granted, would be detrimental to good administration 1.
The first issue that falls for consideration is whether the court ought to determine the question of sufficient interest of an applicant for judicial review before the determination of the substantive claim.
The applicants argue that it is proper for the court to determine the question of sufficient interest at this juncture of the proceedings. In support of this contention, the applicants, as well as Singapore, rely on John Mussington and another v Development Control Authority and others 2.
In Mussington, the appellants applied for and were granted leave to file judicial review proceedings. The appellants thereafter made an application for an interim injunction which the judge refused. Dissatisfied with the judge's refusal, the appellants appealed the judgment and order of the judge.
All of the respondents opposed the appeal. The second respondent went further by filing a counter notice of appeal alleging that the judge erred by finding that the appellants had standing to apply for judicial review.
At paragraph 8 of his judgment, Webster JA (Ag) stated:
“… The ABAA's position is that the appellants do not have standing to bring judicial review proceedings and the entire claim should be struck out. This is a threshold issue and I will deal with it first.”
Premised on this statement by the learned Justice of Appeal, the applicants' position is that Mussington is authority for standing to be dealt with as a “threshold” issue
before consideration of any other issues on the substantive claim. This was, as is in the present context, where –-
(1) The court has granted leave to bring a judicial review claim;
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(2) The applicants have not applied to set aside the grant of leave;
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(3) The applicants have not filed a defence; and
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(4) A date for a substantive hearing has not been set.
The court agrees that standing is usually considered a threshold issue in a holistic analysis of a judicial review claim, but the court strenuously disagrees that these applications properly engage the court's consideration of standing in the context as described above.
In distinguishing Mussington from this case, it is important to pay regard to the circumstances in which the question of standing was raised before the Court of Appeal. As stated previously, the counter appeal challenged the judge's finding that the appellants had standing to apply for judicial review. That counter appeal was, therefore, against the judge's grant of leave.
The applicants in this case do not take issue with the court's order to grant leave to GLA to file judicial review proceedings. There is also no application before the court alleging that the court erred in finding that GLA had standing to apply for judicial review. It is expressly stated in submissions filed by Range that Range is not seeking any order to overturn an earlier order 3. The applicants specifically ask the court to determine the substantive question of standing as a preliminary issue, prior to the substantive hearing of the matter.
The authorities are clear that the court usually analyses standing at two stages in a judicial review claim:
(1) Supperstone, Goudie and Walker on Judicial Review 4:
“ Instead,...
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