Knight v First Caribbean International Bank Ltd; Knight v Knight

JurisdictionGrenada
JudgeMitchell, J.A.
Judgment Date20 January 2012
Neutral CitationGD 2012 CA 1
CourtCourt of Appeal (Grenada)
Docket NumberCivil Appeal No. 32 of 2011; GDAHCV 415 of 2011; GDAHCV 467 of 2011
Date20 January 2012

Court of Appeal

Mitchell, J.A. (Ag.)

Civil Appeal No. 32 of 2011; GDAHCV 415 of 2011; GDAHCV 467 of 2011

Knight
and
First Caribbean International Bank Limited
Knight
and
Knight
Appearances by written submissions:

Mr. Derick F. Sylvester of Derick F. Sylvester & Associates, Legal Practitioners for Kent Knight.

Ms. Shireen J. Wilkinson of Wilkinson, Wilkinson & Wilkinson, Legal Practitioners for First Caribbean International Bank Limited.

Ms. Giselle Whiteman of Giselle Whiteman Chambers, Legal Practitioners for Brenda Knight.

Injunction - Interlocutory — General principles for grant of injunction.

Civil appeal — Grant of Power of Attorney by elderly parent to allow access to joint bank account — Injunction granted by judge in court below prohibiting appellant in Claim No. GDAHCV 2011/0467 from acting under Power of Attorney

The appellant, (In Claim No. GDAHCV 2011/0415.) Gregory Knight, is nearly eighty-eight years old and the father of four children, including Kent and Brenda. Kent holds a general Power of Attorney from his father. Brenda and Gregory hold a joint savings account at First Caribbean International Bank Limited (“First Caribbean”), access to which is the subject of the claims made by the parties in the court below. Gregory is physically unwell and presently hospitalised.

Prior to hospitalisation, Gregory attempted to withdraw funds from his bank account at First Caribbean, but was not allowed to do so by the bank. First Caribbean explained that the issue was that on Gregory's last two visits, he had not been able to make his request to the officer attending to him. He could not form a sentence, so the bank had been unable to assist him.

Gregory subsequently gave Kent the abovementioned Power of Attorney, authorising him expressly to manage all his affairs in relation to the joint account with Brenda at the bank. However, First Caribbean would not permit him to withdraw money from the account despite presenting the Power of Attorney. This caused Gregory to be concerned since he was hospitalised and required funds to pay for his medical expenses as well as the salary of his helper.

Kent, acting on Gregory's behalf, applied to the High Court for an injunction to compel the bank to permit him to operate the account at First Caribbean. Brenda, on the other hand, applied for an injunction to restrain Kent from acting under the Power of Attorney, including withdrawing money from the joint account, and to surrender the Power of Attorney to the court pending the hearing and determination of the matter. The learned judge granted the interim injunction applied for by Brenda, and refused Gregory's injunction. Kent, acting on Gregory's behalf, appealed.

Held: dismissing the appeal with costs in the amount of $1,500.00 to be paid by Gregory to First Caribbean, that:

  • 1. The learned judge was entitled to take the view that the Power of Attorney should be called in to court and that the account should be frozen pending the outcome of the trial. There was no reason for the judge to believe that the freezing of the account would leave Gregory's domestic bills unpaid in the meantime.

  • 2. In the circumstances of this particular family case, the element of an undertaking as to damages would not have been a significant one before the learned trial judge. She would have therefore been justified in giving it little weight.

  • 3. The issue of balance of convenience does not appear to have any relevance to the circumstances of this case. The balance of the elderly, hospitalized parent's convenience was not a real issue.

1

Mitchell, J.A. (Ag.): This is one of those sad family disputes between children over the care and control of an elderly parent. However, the point for me to determine in this appeal is not the merits of the case between them but the matter of the granting of an interim injunction relating to the operating of the elderly parent's bank account.

2

A perusal of the file reveals that on 21st October 2011, Her Ladyship the Hon. Madam Justice Clare Henry in Grenada ordered the two civil claims with numbers GDAHCV 2011/0415 and GDAHCV 2011/0467 be consolidated. Due to the multiplicity of appellants and respondents and of Knights in this matter I mean no disrespect by referring to the parties from now on by their first names only in order to be able to distinguish them clearly.

3

In the first case, there was an application by Gregory through his attorney Kent for an injunction ordering the bank to honour the contents of the Power of Attorney dated 16th September 2011. In the second case, there was an application by Brenda for an injunction restraining Kent from acting under the same Power of Attorney. At the time that the learned trial judge ordered the matters consolidated, she ordered Brenda to serve her application for an injunction on Kent at his address in England by Federal Express, and on his counsel in Grenada via fax. She adjourned the consolidated matters for later hearing. On 31st October 2011, the learned trial judge heard the applications. She granted an interim prohibitory injunction in favour of Brenda. She also ordered Kent Knight to immediately surrender to the Court the Power of Attorney until the hearing and determination of the matter. She refused the injunction that Gregory had applied for.

4

On 18th November 2011, Kent appealed to the Court of Appeal against the order of 31st October 2011 by filing a “Notice of Appeal (Interlocutory Appeal) (pursuant to CPR 62.10, SRO 26 of 2011)”. The appeal seeks a setting aside of the order and a mandatory injunction ordering First Caribbean International Bank Limited (“First Caribbean”) to honour the contents of the Power of Attorney, among other things. No appeal is made against the consolidation order of 28th October 2011.

5

Kent has been trying to obtain the consent of the other parties to have the appeal dealt with under rule 62.6 of the Civil Procedure Rules 2000 (“CPR”) as a summary appeal. No such consent has been produced. Rather, there is an indication that one of the parties has refused to consent. The matter cannot, therefore, proceed under CPR 62.6 as a summary appeal. Instead it proceeds as an interlocutory appeal...

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