Liberty Club Ltd v The Attorney General of Grenada
| Jurisdiction | Grenada |
| Judge | Moore, J. |
| Judgment Date | 01 January 1994 |
| Neutral Citation | GD 1994 CA 1 |
| Docket Number | No. 292 of 1994 |
| Court | Court of Appeal (Grenada) |
| Date | 01 January 1994 |
Court of Appeal
Moore, J.
No. 292 of 1994
Mrs L. Grant for the appellant
Dr. Francis Alexis, Attorney General for the respondents
Industrial Law - Trade Union — Recognition — Meaning of “a majority of workers” in Trade Union Recognition Act.
By Notice of Motion filed on June 24, 1994 the Appellant sought the following orders:
“(1) The Certificate of the second-named respondent issued pursuant to Section 4 (4) of the Trade Union's Recognition Act be declared wrong in law and quashed accordingly;
(2) Such further or other relief as this Honourable court thinks fit.”
Upon the following grounds:
“(1) The result of the poll did not show that Grenada Technical and. Allied Workers Union obtained the majority required by law;
(2) The second-named respondent erred in law in granting a certificate to the Grenada Technical and Allied Workers Union as T. A. W. U. did not obtain the majority required by law on the poll;
(3) The second-named respondent did not issue the said certificate within the period prescribed by the law.”
By letter dated the 26th of the April, 1994, Andre Lewis, General Secretary of the Grenada Technical and Allied Workers Union, wrote to then Minister of Labour, The Honourable Edzel Thomas applying for certification as the bargaining agent of all employees of the La Source Hotel at Port Salines upon the contention of the union that all of the said employees were members of the union in good standing.
On 29th of May, 1994, E. M. Gary, President General of the Grenada Manual, Maritime and Intellectual Workers Union wrote to the Minister of Labour requesting that the Ministry conduct a poll among the workers employed at the La Source Hotel. That union claimed to have within its membership the majority of the persons employed at the hotel, thereby giving that union the official and legal right to bargain for and on behalf of the workers at the hotel.
On Tuesday 7th June, 1994 a poll was taken of the workers appropriate for collective bargaining at the La Source Hotel by the Minister of Labour. The result of that poll was that the Grenada Technical and Allied Workers Union gained what Mr Abel Newton the Deputy Labour Commissioner described as the requisite majority. In terms of figures the results were as follows:
“Number of workers — 225
Number of Workers Present — 102
Number of Workers absent — 122
Number of Workers voting — 102
Number of workers who abstained — nil
Number of workers voted “Yes” — 93
Number of workers voted “No” — 9
Number of workers spoilt votes — nil
Tally: TAWU — 70
GMMWU — 23
These results were certified by the Labour Officer concerned and were duly communicated by Mr Abel Newton, the Deputy Labour Commissioner to the Manager of the La Source Hotel and to the General Secretaries of the Unions concerned. The result of the poll therefore meant that the Technical and Allied Workers Union had emerged victorious in the poll scoring 70 votes whereas the rival union, The Grenada Manual Maritime Intellectual Workers Union was defeated having scored only 23 votes out of the 102 votes actually cast. It is to be noted at this point that the number of voters absent was 123 which means to say that, of the bargaining unit of 225, less than fifty per cent of the voters entitled to vote actually cast their votes. It is for this reason that the appellant contend, and contend with such vigour, that the successful Union, that is to say the Technical and Allied Workers Union did not gain a majority of the workers in the bargaining unit. They merely gained, said the appellants, a majority of those voters who were present and who did actually cast their votes.
Upon the completion of the poll held on 7th June, 1994 the Minister responsible for Labour, on the 13th of June, 1994, issued a certificate to the General Technical and Allied Workers Union as the bargaining agent for the workers employed at the La Source Hotel. This information was duly communicated to the hotel by letter dated June 13, 1994, written by Mr Abel Newton, the Deputy Commissioner of Labour.
The appellant's complaint is based upon five grounds as set out in paragraph 8 of the affidavit of Mr Kurt Vogel filed in support of this motion. The grounds are:
(1) That the Grenada Technical and Allied Worker Union does not have as members in good standing a majority of the workers at the hotel.
(2) The hotel is, the unit appropriate for collective bargaining.
(3) The Grenada Technical and Allied Workers Union did not gain the majority required by law.
(4) The second-named respondent erred in law in issuing the said certificate, and
(5) In any event the said certificate was not issued within the statutory period.
In Dominica case of Charles Savarin v. John Williams, Civil Appeal No. 3 of 1995, the Rt. Hon. Sir Vincent Floissac, C. J. said:
“I start with the basic principle that the interpretation of every word or phrase of a statutory provision is derived from the legislative intention in regard to the meaning which that word or phrase should bear. That legislative intention is an inference drawn from the primary meaning of the word or phrase with such modifications to that meaning as may necessary to mate it concordant with the context. In this regard, the statutory context comprises every other word or phrase used in the statute, all implications therefrom and all relevant surrounding circumstances which may properly be regarded as indications of the legislative intention.”
One of the factors which the learned chief justice identified as being relevant to the determination of that appeal, was the legislative object or purpose of the relevant legislation. On this matter His Lordship said,
“There can be no doubt that the legislative object or purpose of a statue is a most important component of. the statutory context by reference to which legislative intention may be inferred or the words and phrases of the statute may be interpreted.”
In Pepper v. Hart [1993] 1 All E.R. 42 at 50, Lord Bridge said:
“The days have long passed when the courts adopted a strict constructionist view of interpretation which required them to adopt the literal meaning of the language. The courts now adopt a purposive approach which seeks to give effect to the true purpose of legislation and are prepared to look at much extraneous material that bears on the background against which the legislation was enacted.”
The Trade Unions Recognition Act, Chapter 325 is entitled:
“An Act to provide for the compulsory recognition, by one of tire factors which the learned Chief Justice identified employers of trade unions that represent a majority of workers. “
This makes it clear that the purpose and intendment of the Act is to provide a legislation framework for the compulsory recognition, by employers, of the trade unions that represent a majority of workers.
The difficulties presented in this case, embodied in the issues which have been so vigorously joined between the parties, concern, in the main:
The true meaning and interpretation of the words “a majority of workers”, and
whether the common law freedom of contract can be overridden by a statutory provision which seeks to truncate or curtail that freedom.
Dr. Alexis for the respondents contends that the expression “a majority of the workers” section 3(1); “a majority of the members” section 4(2) and “the requisite majority” section 4(4) are not qualified by any such adjective as absolute, or overall, or any other descriptive epithet which would suggest that anything other than a simple majority is required. In his written submission, Dr Alexis contends:
3. This majority is attained when a union obtains the votes of a simple majority, that is more than 50 per cent of the workers actually casting votes in a po11, once all the members in the unit were afforded a fair opportunity to vote as was the case here. The afforded a fair opportunity to vote as the case, here. The requirement of a majority vote under the Act does not entail that the successful union obtain more than 50 per cent of all the workers in the unit entitled to vote, whether or not they all actually cast ballots which is an absolute majority.”
I agree with and accept the contentions of Dr. Alexis in support of which he cites:
4. Knowles v Zoological Society of London [1959] 2 All ER 595 (REF.2)
Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979), page 861 (REF.3)
Re Young and Glanvilles Ltd (1918) 39 DLR 629 (REF.4) .
and contrasts the requirements of a simple majority with cases which require an absolute majority or a majority of fifty percent plus one of all the members of the body; or as provided for in s.39 of the Constitution, of Grenada where majorities is of two minds are required.
Eschewing the strict constructionist view of the appropriate bargaining unit he or she shall certify as the bargaining agent that trade union which has the greatest support of the employees in the bargaining unit determined by preferential ballot. being in any event more than 50 per cent of those employees who cast ballots.”
Subsection 2 of section 29 clearly contemplates and caters for a situation where more than one trade union challenges for recognition and for certification as the exclusive bargaining agent for workers in a particular bargaining unit. The questions of recognition and certification have been the subject matter of bitter disputes in the course of the heroic struggle of workers for the right to form and belong to trade unions; the right to have those Trade Unions recognized by employers; and for the right of those trade unions to represent the workers in their perennial quest for better wages and conditions of work.
Most of those struggles have been between the workers on the one hand and the employers...
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